


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**1970/04/01**

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



ACTION

SECRET/NODIS

April 1, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: John H. Holdridge *JH*

SUBJECT: Revised Warsaw Instructions

At Tab A are State's draft instructions for Ambassador Stoessel's use at the next Warsaw meeting, as revised following your telephone conversation with Ambassador Brown on March 26. These instructions I believe will meet your suggestions on:

- responding in a positive manner on the higher-level meeting;
- lending greater emphasis to the question of reducing tensions in the entire Far East area, of which the Taiwan area would be only a part;
- opening discussions of the modalities of the higher-level meeting.

The significant changes are in paragraphs 4, 6, 8, 12 and 15.

In addition, Secretary Rogers has instructed that the phrase "in Washington and Peking" be added to the last sentence of paragraph 16 following "further discussions" to indicate subsequent high-level contacts might be in both capital cities and not only in Peking.

I see no problem in any of the changes made by State. I would point out, however, that there might be a drawback in the limitation of the initial contact to two or three weeks, as laid out in the draft instructions. It is conceivable that the period needed to reach some quid pro quo over knotty issues might take longer, but we would nevertheless be constrained to pull out within the time-frame given to the Chinese because we had ourselves imposed this limitation. In such an event, as the instructions now read, the implication is that our whole entourage would then depart. I appreciate

SECRET/NODIS

April 6, 1970

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: 44019795301

By: 622 NARA Date: 12/15/91

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Secretary Rogers' desire to prevent a situation like that encountered by Kuznetsov in Peking, where he has been stuck for quite sometime with no progress in the Sino-Soviet talks. In our case, we might possibly wish to work out a plan by which our representative could plead urgent business elsewhere after two or three weeks, but leave a small liaison staff behind. If this approach were tried, I believe that the guidance would need to be modified somewhat. We do not know how much the Chinese are prepared to give or how long it will take them to move, and the maintenance of a liaison group in Peking may be about the only gain we could make at this stage of the talks.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

That you clear State's guidance at Tab A as now written.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Alternatively, that you authorize me to work out with State a slight modification which would permit maintenance of a contact in Peking, even without the presence of a higher-level representative.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Att.

SECRET/NODIS